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MY EXPERTISE 
 
1. I, Liza Schuster, am a Reader in the Department of Sociology, City University 
London and have been employed as a researcher at both the University of Oxford, and 
the London School of Economics. I began conducting fieldwork in Afghanistan in 
September 2012, and except for six months in 2013, I lived in Kabul until August 2015. 
From August 2014‐August 2015 I was also the Research Manager at the Afghanistan 
Centre at Kabul University (ACKU), Kabul, Afghanistan, offering courses in Research 
Methodology and mentoring Afghan academic staff and students. In Afghanistan, I 
conducted research into both the consequences of forced return for Afghan migrants and 
their families and into the migration decision‐making process, before leaving to take up 
my post again at City University London. In 2016, I made a number of short visits 
(December 2015‐January 2016; June‐July 2016, August 2016), before returning again at 
the end of September to commence another 18 month research project funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council – Arts and Humanities Research Council (UK). This 
project is indirectly funded by the Global Challenges Research Fund and was awarded in 
response to an Urgent Forced Displacement Call. For 14 of the next 18 months I will split 
my time between ACKU and the Ministry for Refugees and Repatriation. 
 
2. I received my PhD in Political Science on Political Asylum in Britain and Germany from  
the University of Southampton in 1998, and have published extensively on asylum, 
refuge and migration, including The Use and Abuse of Political Asylum in Britain and 
Germany (see attached CV). More recently, I have published on forced return to 
Afghanistan (Schuster and Majidi 2013, 2014). I have also published a number of articles 
in online journals on this topic, and provided expert reports/testimony in France and 
Norway. Some of these have been translated into French. I am consulted by immigration 
lawyers and representatives of Refugee Councils in Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Norway and Switzerland. 
 3. I have worked with Afghan refugees (the overwhelming majority from the Hazara 
ethnic group) in Paris, France since 2008 and in Afghanistan (largely in Kabul and in 
Baghlan province) since 2011. I have lived with Afghan families (again the majority were 
Hazara and Tajik, though I have also been a guest in Pashtu homes, and received guests 
from all ethnicities in my Kabul home). Over a period of four years, I hosted Hazara and 
Tajik in my home in Paris. Over these years, I have become familiar with Hazara history 
and culture. I have also witnessed first-hand the discrimination, hostility and insecurity to 
which they are subject, and which I detail below (see Hazara and Taliban). As the 
historical discrimination and persecution of the Hazara is now documented, I will confine 
my remarks to the current situation in Afghanistan and specifically Kabul. 
 
4. I made my first visit to Afghanistan in July 2011. This was followed by a 1 year 
Leverhulme Fellowship which funded six months fieldwork in Afghanistan (September 
2012 ‐ March 2013) and 6 months as a guest researcher (Chercheur Invité) at the Centre 
des Etudes des Relations Internationales at Sciences Po, Paris. During that first research 
visit to Afghanistan (2012‐2013), I spent three months in Kabul and three months in Pule 
Khumri in Baghlan Province (hosted by a Hazara family), interviewing those who had 
been deported and their families. 
 
5. I also visited Mazar‐i‐Sharif, Samangan in the North, and Herat and Islam Qala on the 
Iranian‐Afghan border. In September 2013 I returned to Kabul, where I continued to work 
and live for a further two years. I have also travelled in Parwan (through Dare – 
Ghorband), Kapisa and Bamyan provinces, and returned to Baghlan and Herat provinces 
on a number of occasions (the latter only accessible by air). However, on visits in 2016, 
the deteriorating security situation meant I was unable to leave Kabul, and access to 
Bamyan is now also safely possible only by air. It has never been possible for me access 
other Hazara areas such as Daikundi, Ghazni or Maidan Wardak. On my 3rd visit this year 
in August, I was obliged for the first time to stay in a secure hotel, and travel in an 
armoured vehicle with security guards. As a result, I understood better how much more 
constrained and partial a view of Afghan society foreign officials and NGO workers have 
of Afghan society. 
 
6. My research project in Afghanistan was an exploration of the consequences of  
deportation for those deported to Afghanistan and for their families. Findings have been 
published in the journal Migration Studies (Schuster and Majidi 2013), the Journal of 
Ethnic and Migration Studies (Schuster and Majidi 2014) and I have a book manuscript in 
preparation. In conducting this research I interviewed those recently returned, their 
families as well as government officials, INGO representatives, members of diplomatic 
missions and members of the police and military. I have also a wide network of contacts 
with non‐migrant Afghans and those who have returned voluntarily. 
 
 
HAZARA (AND RELATIONS WITH TALIBAN) 
 
13. For the sake of the Tribunal, I wish to briefly clarify an error of fact in the 2007 refusal 
letter, para. 18, which would have had a bearing on the original claim and to contest 
statements made in ASL 2734, p.4‐5. Para. 18 of the refusal letter states: ‘it is not 
 
considered credible that someone of Hazara ethnicity, actively recruited other Hazara 
people to fight for the Taliban, or would collect taxes to aid the Taliban, when the Taliban 
were waging a wear against the Hazara people themselves’. However, when Hazara areas 
came under Taliban control, this is exactly what happened, as those who refused to 
convert to Sunni Islam and to work with the Taliban were threatened with death. I 
subsequently confirmed this with other Hazara colleagues and friends who had lived in 
Baghlan during the Taliban period, who told me that for many there was no choice 
though I was unable to assess how widespread it was, the impression given was that it 
was not unusual. They also told me that it was not a sin to pretend to convert in order to 
save one’s life. Specifically for this report, I asked Mr. C about this and he replied 
(26/08/2016) ‘Some local commanders of Harakat and other smaller groups who were 
marginalised by Wahdat did in fact work for the Taliban… After most of the Hazara areas 
fell to the Taliban in 1997-8. In areas currently under Taliban control, this continues to be 
the case. Nonetheless, the fact that someone did collaborate with the Taliban would be a 
source of shame and could create problems for the family. It is also plausible that that 
family history, would offer a pretext for persecution by anti‐Taliban forces even today. 
 
14. Members of the Afghan Hazara minority group continue, in spite of significant 
improvements in their situation since 2001, to suffer discrimination in terms of education 
and employment, even in Kabul. The parts of the city where most Hazara live are 
neglected by the government, and improvements are largely financed by the Hazara 
community themselves. Sections of other communities (e.g. Pashtun, Tajik, Turkmen, 
Uzbek) are also neglected. This is a society in which next to nothing is done for the 
poorer sections of society. However, the Hazara suffer not just because of poverty, but 
also because most are physically distinctive and mostly Shia (there are a small number of 
Sunni Hazara, and a small number of Shia Tajik) in an overwhelmingly Sunni population. 
As a result of their religion and the large numbers of Hazara in Shia Iran, they are closely 
associated with a neighbor largely distrusted by other sections of Afghan society. 
 
15. It is very difficult (impossible) in Afghanistan to gather reliable statistics on any issue, 
and on ethnic groups in particular. There has been no census since 1979, so it is not even 
possible to be sure of the size of the Hazara population in Afghanistan in general, or in 
Kabul in particular. Most estimates (CIA factbook, Afghan Central Statistics Organisation, 
Asia Foundation) place them at between 9%‐19% of the total population, but in the light 
of massive displacement, return and repeated displacement, and the difficulties of 
collecting data there is no way to know for sure (so that Refusal letters citing population 
figures for Afghanistan are misleading – even the CIA World Factbook figures are merely 
estimates). 
 
16. Hazara are concentrated in certain areas of central Afghanistan (most notably in the 
province of Bamiyan), and some districts of other provinces (parts of Baghlan, Balkh, 
Daikundi, Ghazni, Ghor, Herat, Maidan Wardak, Uruzgan). There are also Hazara 
 
 
 
 populations in a number of other provinces. Within Kabul, the same pattern is evident. 
The western parts of the city, Dashti‐Barchi, Afshar and Pole Kosht, are almost exclusively 
Hazara, others (Pole Sorkh, Pole Sukhta, Deh Bori, Omid Sabz) are largely Hazara, but 
there are areas where the population is more mixed (this pattern is also obvious for 
other ethnic groups). There is an excellent Masters dissertation by Mohammad Ali Karimi 
(University of Ottowa, 2011) which details the spatial exclusion of Hazara to Western 
Kabul. Like Karimi, I have witnessed some of the abuse directed at Hazara, including 
educated colleagues referring to them as ‘ugly’, ‘no noses’, ‘monkeys’ and (because of 
their religion), as qaffirs. In the following section, due to the absence of reliable statics, 
the empirical data on which I rely is qualitative, drawn from my own oberservation 
(2011‐2015) and relevant research and media reports (referenced). 
 
17. Education 
 
More than any other ethnic group in Afghanistan the Hazara have embraced educational 
opportunities at every level, and, though there continues to be a significant gender gap, 
Hazara girls are also more likely to attend primary, secondary and higher education than 
girls of any other ethnic group. Government institutions provide very poor quality 
education, are overcrowded and teaching is done in three shifts per day, teachers are 
underpaid and unable to survive from teaching alone (https://www.afghanistan‐ 
analysts.org/too‐few‐badly‐paid‐and‐unmotivated‐the‐teacher‐crisis‐and‐the‐quality‐of‐ 
education‐in‐afghanistan‐2/). In Hazara areas, government provision is particularly bad, 
but the Hazara community has built its own schools, and currently the school with the 
best results in the country is Maktab Marafat in Dashti Barchi (at which I taught for one 
term in 2012), and it has the highest rate of success in the Kankor, the University 
entrance exam (https://marefat.wordpress.com/about/ ; https://www.afghanistan‐ 
analysts.org/cheating‐and‐worse‐the‐university‐entry‐kankur‐exams‐as‐a‐bottleneck‐for‐ 
higher‐education/). Nonetheless, much of the optimism reported for example in this NYT 
article (http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/04/world/asia/04hazaras.html) from 2010 has 
since dissipated as Hazara hopes and expectations for their community have been 
unfulfilled. 
 
18. There have been ethnic tensions in Kabul University with Hazara students 
complaining of discriminatory treatment by University staff and Professors. This led in 
May 2013 to student protests and a hunger strike 
(http://stream.aljazeera.com/story/201305282100‐0022788). The previous year 
sectarian clashes between Sunni and Shia students left one Hazara student dead and 30 
students injured (http://www.rferl.org/content/three‐universities‐close‐in‐kabul‐after‐ 
sectarian‐clashes/24780754.html). While there has not been similar violence, Hazara 
students find themselves discriminated against in marking and grades. Due in part to the 
discrimination, but also to the shortage of places in government universities, there has 
been a massive expansion in the number of for‐profit and not‐for‐profit universities 
(https://www.afghanistan‐analysts.org/publication/aan‐papers/bureaucratic‐policies‐ 
 
 
 
  
and‐patronage‐politics‐prospects‐and‐challenges‐of‐private‐higher‐education‐in‐ 
afghanistan/). While many of these are mixed, some have been founded and cater 
specifically to the Hazara community as a way of avoiding discrimination (e.g. Ibn Sina 
and Gowarshad Universities), though they are open to students from other ethnicities. I 
have visited both, and though there is a great deal of ambition and effort evident, they 
are small and massively under‐resourced. In August this year (2016), while discussing the 
possible of creating a course at Ibn SIna University, an ethnic Uzbek and an ethnic Pashtu 
colleague both spoke disparagingly of these institutions are “Hazara Universities”. 
Whatever the quality of the education offered by these universities (public and private), 
there has been a significant increase in the number of Hazara graduates in Kabul (and 
Bamiyan, Herat and Mazar). However, there has also been a huge increase in frustration 
and resentment as the effort expanded and expense incurred by these students and their 
family rarely leads to employment, not only because of high unemployment, but also 
because of discrimination and structural inequalities. 
 
19. Employment 
 
Overwhelmingly, recruitment in Afghanistan is conducted through personal networks. 
This form of nepotism is built into the structures of Afghan society and impacts 
disproportionally on those groups who have traditionally been excluded from education 
and employment. When a position becomes available, if it is not earmarked for a 
member of the manager’s network, other employees will begin lobbying for members of 
their networks. This is understandable since unemployment is high: the most recent 
estimate by Sarajuddin Isar (formerly of Afghan Central Bank, currently PhD candidate in 
Political Economy at SOAS, London) puts it at 60%, while during a recent conversation 
with a senior advisor in the Ministry of Labour (15 August 2016), it was put at 10%, with 
underemployment at 29%, but with women largely excluded from the workforce. 
 
20. Hazaras have limited access to professional networks because of historical and 
current discrimination. Having worked in an organization (ACKU) committed to equal 
opportunities, I have seen and heard the reactions of non‐Hazara to Hazara 
appointments. This have sometimes manifested as grumbles about Hazara ‘not knowing 
their place’ or ‘taking over’, on other occasions as complaints about ‘Hazara lovers’ in the 
organization or most often as ‘jokes’. On other occasions and elsewhere, I have heard 
Hazara referred to as donkeys fit only to push carts, or grow potatos (a reference to the 
main crop in Bamiyan). Non‐Hazara taxi drivers have sometimes refused to take me to 
Hazara areas while others have warned me about staying overnight in such areas, 
describing all Hazara as drug addicts and thieves. 
 
21. Certainly, with few regular jobs available, the majority of the Hazara population 
remains trapped in poverty and employed in menial work including as carters, drain 
clearers and carters. However, Hazaras have also organized to overcome such 
discrimination, setting up their own businesses, including media companies (such as Tolo) 
and in particular using links to Hazara strongmen such as Khalili and Mohaqeq to 
 
 
  
access contracts and financing. As with all other groups in Afghanistan – without those 
kinds of connections, it is not possible to access employment or set up a business. 
Professor Maley’s assessment of young Hazaras applies equally to young men of other 
ethnicities “An Hazara who is returned to Kabul without social connections is likely to end 
up destitute, or be exposed to gross exploitation or criminal predation” 
(http://www.scribd.com/doc/204142851/Maley‐Hazaras‐Kabul‐Opinion‐February‐2014). 
 
22. Politics and Public life 
 
More than at any other time in the past, the Hazara are visible in public life, in particular 
on television. The head of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission is a 
Hazara woman – Sima Samar. And Hazara politicians, most notably Khalili and Mohaqeq, 
were given high level Cabinet positions in the post‐Taliban government under President 
Karzai. However, Hazara political influence has declined significantly since the elections in 
2014: currently there are only three Hazara in cabinet, but all in small Ministries: 
Mahmoud Baligh (Public Works, where Mr.B’s son works), Wahidi (Comms and IT), 
Humayoon Rasa (Commerce and Industries). The poorest and least resourced Ministry, 
Ministry of Refugees and Repatriations, is run by Hussain Alemi Balkhi, a Shia Sayed who 
studied in Iran. In the three key security ministries, not one of the deputies is Hazara. 
Much of the blame for this must lie with Khalili nor Mohaqeq, neither of whom are skilled 
politicians. In discussion with Hazara at all social levels in 2014 & 2015, I queried why 
support was being given to these two men, known to be corrupt and to have profited 
from land grabs, rather than Bashar Dost, for example, who is known to be clean and is 
widely respected. The response was that there was a strong chance that civil war would 
return and the Hazara would experienced fighters to defend them. 
 
23. Having said that, the response of these leaders to recent events has seriously 
damaged their credibility in their own community. In November 2015, seven Hazara were 
kidnapped, including two women and a child and all were beheaded. The murder of the 
women and a child profoundly shocked the community and led to the largest public 
protest seen in Kabul. The fear and vulnerability felt by this community brought tens of 
thousands on to the streets of Kabul, but also highlighted their powerlessness 
(http://www.npr.org/2015/11/11/455657480/protesters‐flood‐kabul‐streets‐after‐ 
beheading‐of‐7‐afghan‐hazaras). The protesters, including families of the victims, 
brought the bodies of the victims to the gates of the Presidential Palace and asked the 
President to come to speak to them. They waited for several hours, before a small group 
tried to scale the Palace wall and were fired on 
(https://www.facebook.com/8am.af/videos/991161194261099/; 
https://www.afghanistan‐analysts.org/the‐zabul‐seven‐protests‐who‐speaks‐for‐the‐ 
victims/). The presence of people from different ethnic groups demonstrated for the first 
time a sense of ethnic solidarity in the face of 2015’s increased violence. However, the 
response of Mohaqeq, the highest ranking Hazara in Ghani’s government, to the 
demonstrators (brutally and crudely telling them they weren’t the only ones who had 
 
 
 
  
suffered and attempting to delegitimise the protest by questioning the motives of the 
 
organisers ‐ http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/11/12/protest‐leaders‐promoting‐ 
personal‐agenda‐alleges‐mohaqiq?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twitter) has 
increased the Hazara community’s sense of vulnerability. 
 
24. During the ongoing protests against the re‐routing of an electricity pipeline that 
would have bypassed Hazarajat, footage emerged of Khalili agreeing to a request from 
Ashraf Ghani to persuade the Enlightment Movement (a social movement of young 
Hazara) to call off the 23 July 2016 demonstration in exchange for political favours and 
money (see next section). Khalili was unable to deliver, but the broadcast of video 
footage of the meeting on television has compounded the sense of disillusionment with 
the established Hazara political leaders, just as those preparing to challenge it have been 
killed. 
 
25. Security for Hazara in Kabul 
 
Inside Kabul, the first significant large scale attack on the Hazara since 2011 (when a 
suicide bomber attacked the Abu Fazl Mosque, which claimed more than 70 lives), took 
place on 23 July 2when the demonstration called by the Enlightenment Movement was 
attacked by Daesh. 80 people were killed and 270 injured. Many of those killed were the 
new, educated generation of Hazara, who were challenging the older, corrupt generation 
of Hazara leaders. This was a serious body blow to the community, which is still reeling. 
 
Other groups targeting the Hazara include Hekmatyar Gulbuddin’s Pashtu Hizbi Islami, 
sometime Taliban ally, who announced support for Daesh in July 2015 
(http://www.ibtimes.com/gulbuddin‐hekmatyars‐hezb‐e‐islami‐announces‐support‐isis‐ 
afghanistan‐combat‐taliban‐1996462). To underline the point made at para.13 above, 
Gulbuddin’s Hizbi Islami and Mazari’s largely Hazara Wahdat were briefly allies in 1993. 
In 2013, Gulbuddin announced in his Eid al‐Fetr message, referring to Hazara: 
“foreigner’s slaves must know that their excitement for Americans will end and they will 
get unforgettable lessons. The day ‐when oppressed people of Afghanistan arise‐ will 
arrive to obtain their usurped rights; then at the time; those excited for the foreigners 
and those usurpers of Afghanistan will find no place of asylum in the East, west, north, 
south and centre of the country and will lose their lands and recently developed country 
towns. Some of them will flee to Iran; where Iranian will humiliate them as they have 
been doing in the post”. 
 
26. Ironically, the progress that Hazara have made in education and their higher profile in 
public life has made them vulnerable to anti‐government elements who see them as 
supporters and main beneficiaries of the international forces/community in Afghanistan, 
and the target of resentment by (some, not all) members of other ethnic groups. In 
particular, in West Kabul there has been a massive growth in construction by Hazara 
developers, including most notoriously the new suburb of Shahrak Omid Sabz (a huge 
tract of land grabbed by the brother of Khalili, former vice‐President) though this also 
 
 
 
  
makes the developers vulnerable to kidnapping. 
 
 
 
27. Security Concerns outside Kabul 
 
It is on the roads that most attacks against Hazara occur. Of the 3 dozen extended Hazara 
families known to me personally, most come from provinces such as Baghlan, Balkh, 
Bamiyan, Daikundi, Ghazni, Ghor, Herat, Uruzgan or Wardak. Of those, only those from 
Baghlan or Balkh would regularly visit their province of origin, because travel was too 
dangerous, in particular for men (http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/24586‐ 
three‐kidnapped‐youths‐released‐after‐ransom‐paid ; 
http://www.theguardian.com/australia‐news/2016/mar/14/hazara‐asylum‐seeker‐to‐be‐ 
forcibly‐deported‐from‐australia‐to‐afghanistan ; http://www.bbc.com/news/world‐asia‐ 
28481282). Others would only travel for emergencies (family bereavements or illnesses). 
On a visit to Bamiyan in 2013, I travelled on the only safe road of three possible roads but 
was obliged to wear a burqa, and when, crossing Parwan on the Dare Ghorband road, a 
group of men in civilians attempted to stop the car, the Hazara driver decided it would 
safer to put his foot down. Two days later, there was a shootout at a similar checkpoint 
targeting a hazara family whose two year old daughter was killed. Members of ‘my’ 
Hazara family who were trying to get to Bamiyan witnessed the incident and turned back 
to Kabul. 
 
28. A woman with whom I spent a great deal of time in Dashti Barchi, explained she had 
to travel to Ghazni in 2014 in a group of other women to visit a dying relative without her 
husband or sons because the risk of the Taliban stopping the bus and killing or 
kidnapping the male members of the family was too high. She described being stopped 
on one journey and seeing Hazara men separated from the other passages before being 
killed. This was not shared as part of an interview or to describe the difficulties facing 
Hazara, but was just part of a general conversation, and I heard similar stories from other 
Hazara over the years. On another occasion, when visiting the same family, I overheard a 
conversation about the woman’s nephew to had been trying to get to Kabul to start 
university, but who had been taken off the bus by Taliban and beaten and interrogated 
before being allowed to leave. That road is the main hghway that links Kabul to Kandahar 
through Ghazni, and I have heard similar experiences recounted by young men forcibly 
removed from Norway, Denmark and Britain who were trying to get to family members 
in those provinces. They had been deported to Kabul, but were unable to find 
accommodation or employment because they had no social networks. All had decided to 
risk the journey to Ghazni because they had managed to contact someone who would 
put them up until they could leave the country. 
 
29. 2015 was notable for the number of attacks on Hazara travellers 
(http://worldhazaracouncil.org/en/wp‐content/uploads/HazaraTargetKilling20151.pdf). 
Since spring 2015, travel to Baghlan and Balkh has also steeply declined (for the first time 
 I was unable to make my my own regular journey to visit my host family in Pule Khumri, 
Baghlan when I returned to Kabul December 2015‐January 2016, and I have not been 
able to return since). Starting in spring, 31 Hazara were kidnapped, 19 of whom were 
subsequently released in exchange for prisoners, though the details remain unclear 
(http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/11/kidnapped‐afghan‐hazara‐passengers‐released‐ 
author‐says‐pakistan‐knew‐about‐bin‐laden‐raid‐former‐tamil‐nadu‐chief‐minister‐ 
acquitted‐in‐indian‐court/; http://www.bbc.com/news/world‐asia‐32686953 ). This has 
been followed by further kidnappings and murders over the following 12 months (see 
article by Ahmad Shuja, HRW http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2015/05/29/kidnaps‐ 
and‐murders‐could‐presage‐isis‐style‐slaughter‐in‐afghanistan.phtml). 
 
30. Many of the Hazara families with whom I lived in Baghlan province have joined family 
members in Kabul or left the country. These latest displacements were triggered by the 
agreement in September 2015 between Mangal, the Minister for Borders and Tribal 
Affairs, and the Taliban to leave them in control of Dande Ghori 
(http://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/23869‐gulab‐mangal‐defends‐controversial‐ 
dand‐e‐ghori‐deal?lang=en; http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/24770‐taliban‐ 
regains‐ground‐in‐dand‐e‐ghori ), a Baghlan district that abuts the road to Mazar and 
Kunduz, and by the subsequent fall of Kunduz. These two events were linked in the minds 
of those Hazara families who feared that Pule Khumri, the provincial capital would also 
fall. It has not, and a number of families have since returned. 
 
31. It has been argued in a specific report prepared for the Australian government on the 
situation of Hazara in Afghanistan that “no part of the country can be considered free 
from conflict‐related violence…Ethnic tensions exist throughout the country at a local 
level and can result in sporadic violence ... the threat of conflict‐related violence faced by 
Hazaras is similar to that faced by members of other ethnic groups.” 
(http://www.theguardian.com/australia‐news/2016/mar/14/hazara‐asylum‐seeker‐to‐ 
be‐forcibly‐deported‐from‐australia‐to‐afghanistan). This position fails to take account of 
the particular situation of the Hazara, the fact that they are visibly different, that they do 
not belong to the Sunni majority, that their loyalty to Afghanistan is called into question 
and that it is not possible over a brief 15 year period to eradicate centuries of 
discrimination. 
 
32. In the last 18 months the security situation in Afghanistan has seriously deteriorated 
across the country and for all groups. The UNAMA report on civilian casualities in 2015 
described it as the worst on record. Winter 2015/6 did not see the usual hiatus in Taliban 
attacks, but on 14 April they announced the start of their spring offensive and ‘This 
announcement was followed by reports of dozens of attacks for which the Taleban 
claimed responsibility, including in Baghlan, Badghis, Faryab, Ghazni, Helmand, 
Kandahar, Kunar, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Parwan, Sar‐e Pul and Zabul within the 
first 48 hours’ )https://www.afghanistan‐analysts.org/operation‐omari‐taleban‐ 
announces‐2016‐spring‐offensive/) (for further details on the general security situation, 
 
 
 
  
see below). 
 
33. Currently, Hazara in Afghanistan, including Kabul, together with other groups fear the 
country is sliding towards chaos. But as a distinctive minority, who do not share the 
majority religion, and who have been particular beneficiaries of the international 
community and the last 15 years, they are particularly worried that they will be singled 
out for persecution and punishment by Daesh, the Taliban and other anti‐government 
forces. The massacre in July 2016 seems to confirm their worst fears. 
 
 
CURRENT CONDITIONS IN BAGHLAN 
 
34. The following report from the Naval Postgraduate School, Programme for Culture and 
Conflict Studies (http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Baghlan/Baghlan.html ) states: 
 
Baghlan has suffered from ineffective governance since 2001 with nine different 
governors attempting to bring stability and security to the province. The current 
governor, Munshi Abdul Majeed, replaced Haji Mohammad Akbar Barakzai, who 
was appointed in January 2009. A recent series of suicide bombings, factional 
fighting, and criminal activity has continued to plague Baghlan, including its 
provincial capital, Pul‐i‐Khumri. Majeed is a former Hezb‐i‐Islami commander and 
native of Baghlan province who has served as the governor of Badakshan for 
several years before replacing Akbar Barakzai [since this report the Governor has 
 
changed again – on 13 October 2015, Abdul Sattar Barez took over the role] 
 
35. Baghlan is an important province linking Kabul in the South to nine Northern 
provinces, including Kunduz where there is current fighting. On August 14, 2016 Dahana‐ 
e‐Ghori [just to the west of Pule Khumri and neighbouring ] fell to the Taliban after days 
of fighting and there is continuing fighting in Baghlan‐e‐Markazi 
(http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/taliban‐overruns‐district‐afghanistan‐ 
baghlan‐160815073521937.html). In fact, there has been heavy fighting in Dahan‐e‐Ghori 
for more than a year, and a recent news report noted that all roads to the provincial 
capital had been closed for the last six months (February to August 2016) 
(http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2016/08/10/taliban‐attack‐dehna‐ghori‐pushed‐back‐ 
baghlan‐governor). This is significant because Baghlan is strategically important: the main 
electricity supply to the country goes through this province (one reason for routing the 
new line through Bamyan). It also means the Taliban control access to Mr. X’s village of 
Chesme Sir. 
 
36. A particular risk for those who have spent significant time in a European country is 
that they may be seen as ‘contaminated’ by their experiences in Europe. Baghlan is a 
rural province and the main towns of Pule Khumri and Baghlan are ‘provincial’. While 
changing dress would be relatively easy, returning after years in Europe, Mr X will find it 
more difficult to hide changes in attitudes, behaviour, speech and values (and the stress 
if he is suffering from mental health issues would be very great), and this 
 
  
would make him vulnerable to those hostile to Western influences. The following is an 
extract from an article I published 2013 with Majidi: 
 
Life in the West is sometimes seen by community members as having 
‘contaminated’ the teenagers and young adults who left for the UK at a young 
age and returned with visible and invisible signs of their cultural change 
(clothing, behaviour, accent etc.). Life in the UK is perceived as having had a 
negative impact on their development. In the case of one young man 
interviewed in 2009 and again in 2011, from Paghman district in Kabul province, 
his return home led to clashes arising from his changed perspectives: 
 
They all bother me because I went to the UK. They say I lost my culture, became a 
kafir . . . all sorts of insults. Another deportee – Habib – returned and was killed in 
our village last year. I left because I no longer felt safe. But now I have no 
employment, no stable income, no skills, no future and no family by my side. 
(Najib, 22) 
 
…Where those deported are seen as shamed or contaminated, access 
to…networks may be withdrawn. Without networks to offer support and 
employment opportunities, integration into a community is almost impossible 
(Schuster & Majidi 2013). 
 
Paghman District is much closer to Kabul than Baghlan Province, so I believe the risk 
would be at least as great. Catherine Gladwell of Refugee Support Network (RSN) 
encountered the same issue on her field trip: 
 
A quarter of the boys tracked had experienced harm or difficulties as a result of being 
viewed as ‘Westernised outsiders’. Several boys encountered difficulties due to being 
seen as having lapsed in their practice of Islam 
(http://www.fmreview.org/detention/gladwell#sthash.ABHFuYHp.dpuf) 
 
37. In the article with Majidi, I noted a further risk for those forcibly returned (and those 
who return voluntarily). Criminals have been targeting recent returnees from Europe and 
Australia assuming that they must have money and refusing to believe they have been 
deported without any resources (see Schuster and Majidi 2013a). This has led to violent 
robbery and kidnappings. Kidnappers usually target wealthy Afghans, but even the 
perception of having access to money may put someone at risk. 
 
(http://www.rawa.org/temp/runews/2014/01/21/sharp‐rise‐in‐kidnappings‐in‐afghan‐ 
province.html; http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/in‐model‐afghan‐ 
city‐kidnappings‐surge/2013/04/24/2cf88976‐a6b4‐11e2‐9e1c‐ 
bb0fb0c2edd9_story.html) 
 
38. This phenomenon is corroborated by Catherine Gladwell of RSN (see para. 19 above) 
who visited Afghanistan and followed up what happened to young Afghan men who had 
been in contact with the organisation in the UK: 
 
 
 
 
Some [of those returned] were mugged due to a perception that returning from 
Europe must mean returning with money. One boy was kidnapped and held to 
ransom until his family sold additional land to finance his release. 
(http://www.fmreview.org/detention/gladwell). 
 
 
RISK ON RETURN TO KABUL 
 
39. Commentators who refer to Kabul as a large anonymous city are judging it on the 
basis of small enclaves around Shar‐e‐Nau, or from the inside of armoured SUVs. In fact, 
outside the centre, it really is a collection of villages in which the social structures of 
villages in the provinces are replicated to an extraordinary degree. In these areas, 
traditional cultures and norms are preserved and policed. It is true that there is a growing 
urban middle class, but they constitute a tiny minority of the urban population and they 
live in compounds and gated communities. Most Hazara live in West Kabul, in Dashti 
Barchi and the newer suburbs radiating out from it. 
 
40. Professor Maley’s assessment of young Hazaras applies equally to young men of 
other ethnicities “An Hazara who is returned to Kabul without social connections is likely 
to end up destitute, or be exposed to gross exploitation or criminal predation” 
(http://www.scribd.com/doc/204142851/Maley‐Hazaras‐Kabul‐Opinion‐February‐2014). 
I would be particularly worried about returning someone with mental health issues to 
Kabul without strong family ties in the city. As described below, social networks are 
essential to survival in Afghanistan. 
 
41. The UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for assessing the International Protection Needs of 
Asylum‐seekers from Afghanistan (2016) offer guidance on assessing the reasonableness 
of internal relocation, noting that particular attention must be given to: 
 
(i) the availability of traditional support mechanisms, provided by members of the 
applicant’s extended family or members of his or her ethnic group; 
 
(ii) access to shelter in the proposed area of relocation; 
 
(iii) the availability of basic infrastructure and access to essential services in the proposed 
area of relocation, such as sanitation, health care and education; 
 
(iv) the presence of livelihoods opportunities, including access to land for Afghans 
originating from rural areas; and 
 
(v) the scale of internal displacement in the proposed area of relocation. 
 
The next paragraphs address the issue of internal relocation, in particular to Kabul, in 
the light of these guidelines and my own experience of Kabul. 
 
 
  
42. Re (i) From my experience of Afghan social relations (confirmed in the work of 
anthropologists such as Alessandro Monsutti 2005, 2006 and Kristian Harpviken 2009), 
relocation to an area where one does not have the support of a network is very difficult. 
The small number of successfully reintegrated returnees I have interviewed are those 
with dense family networks in Kabul itself with the resources to fund in one case a 
university education and in the other two cases to set up the young men in business (a 
fast food restaurant and a mobile phone shop). 
 
Internal relocation’ is often proposed by courts in Europe as a solution for those 
who cannot be returned to their areas of origin, or to their homes. However, 
‘internal relocation’ in the Afghan context is [extremely difficult, and for many 
people] impossible, due the essential role played by family networks. Without 
networks to offer support and employment opportunities, integration into a 
community is almost impossible. A report published in 2007 by Saito and Hunte 
shows the challenges of complex reintegration, which include the risks of social 
exclusion and discrimination, the lack of any skills that could fit with the Afghan 
labour market even if there were employment opportunities, and the difficulties of 
meeting material needs during ‘reintegration’. In Afghanistan, there is little other 
choice but to go back to where individuals have social connections.(Schuster 
 
&Majidi 2013b). 
 
43. Re (ii) Accommodation (and property) in Kabul is extremely expensive. There is a 
growing rental market, but it is normally families that rent apartments. It is difficult to 
find a single room, they cost around $100 per month, and landlords make ask for up to 
six months rent in advance. Most of those who come to Kabul to work or study stay with 
members of their extended family. Increasingly, but still rarely, groups of young men will 
rent a room together. Young men I have interviewed who have been deported have had 
to stay at the IOM run reception centre at Jangalak, Wasil Abad, but they are asked to 
leave after a few days (two weeks on average). In an interview with the manager of the 
centre at the beginning of April 2014, he told me that in general those deported from the 
UK did not stay there. He speculated that this was probably because they left quickly to 
try and return to Europe, via Iran and or Pakistan, or in some cases, unable to stay in 
Kabul without contacts, they risked returning to home villages. This echoes my own 
findings. 
 
44. In response to a request from the BBC mid‐June 2015, I tried to reconnect with some 
of those who had been forcibly returned, but all of my contacts had left for other 
countries or disappeared. However, a colleague had heard about some who were 
sleeping under Pule Sorkh bridge with the drug addicts. A few days later he went to try 
and locate them, but they had been moved on. However, he found a third – all three are 
now drugs users, and street homeless. Since then, hundreds of these people were loaded 
into buses and taken to a decommissioned based on the outskirts of Kabul. During a visit 
 
 
  
in June 2016, I asked whether any more returnees had been spotted there. However, 
although the people who had been bussed out had largely made there way back, he had 
not been able to return to see if there were any men who had been forcibly returned 
from Europe among them. 
 
45. Re. (iii) Kabul’s population has exploded from 500,000 to 7 million + in the space of  
15 years (even bearing in mind the unreliability of statistics – the numbers have 
exploded), as a result of the largest repatriation operation in history. Many of the 5.7 
million people who have returned from Iran and Pakistan, and the 1,.2 million IDPs who 
have been displaced inside Afghanistan have been unable to return to their original 
homes and a significant number of these have settled around Kabul (UNHCR 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi‐bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e486eb6). Hence, Minister 
Balkhi’s announcement that Kabul could not host those originally from dangerous 
provinces to which they could not return, and a plea for the forced removals to stop (see 
annex 3). 
 
46. The basic infrastructure, including sanitation, education and health have not kept 
pace with this extraordinary growth. There are daily power cuts, the water is 
contaminated and many of the schools (and some Universities) run 3 short shifts a day. 
There are many hospitals in the city, but like schools, most of these are private, run for 
profit and are inadequately staffed by poorly qualified doctors and nurses. Having 
accompanied two families deported from Norway to Kabul in 2014 to hospital I has seen 
this first hand. In one case, the doctor having found nothing wrong with an 8 year old 
child, prescribed (as a cost of $140) vitamins, a calcium supplement and a supply of 
needles to inject saline solution. In another case, a young woman with eye problems was 
given injections of glucose, while another with chronic anaemia was sent home carrying a 
saline solution drip (prescribed for everything from headaches, to low blood pressure to 
gastric troubles). Reference is sometimes made to the availability of treatment and 
medication in MedCOI. I am shocked by their findings. I find it difficult to believe the 
person writing these reports has actually visited the Alaudin facility, the Ministry of 
Public Health’s 60‐bed psychiatric hospital. It is the only public national referral mental 
health hospital for all of Afghanistan, while also serving the needs of all psychiatric 
patients in Kabul. ‘It faces extreme under‐funding, limited staffing and insufficient 
technical capacity’ (International Medical Corps, 2011). The hospital, long notorious for 
its dilapidated and unhygienic state, has only 60 beds (WHO 2006); while experts say at 
least a 300‐bed facility is needed. It was also criticized in a 2010 assessment by the IMC 
for not providing follow‐up treatment post‐discharge and for the high relapse rates of 
mental health patients. In 2016, the dirt and dust in the buildings (and the filthy, no 
longer white coats of the staff), the full beds, to which some patients are tied, provide a 
clear indication of the inadequacy of treatment available. I have spoken to members of 
the families of three people who had spent time there before they were removed. The 
 
 
  
patients are brought here when their families cannot cope and are usually suffering from 
Schizophrenia or drug addiction. The other hospitals referred to are private clinics, very 
expensive and with no guarantees as to the quality of the treatment or facilities. To 
suggest that there is adequate treatment available for PTSD in Kabul is disingenuous to 
say the least. 
 
47. The same document made reference to the availability of drugs in Afghanistan, and 
that is certainly true, although there is also widespread evidence of drugs being out of 
date and counterfeit (Lalani et al 2015 (available at 
http://ajtmh.org/cgi/doi/10.4269/ajtmh.14‐0394; Bashaar et al. (2015) ‘Community 
pharmacists’ attitudes toward the quality and price of locally manufactured generic 
medicines in Kabul, Afghanistan’, Journal of Pharmaceutical Policy and Practice 8:16, 
p.3; see also http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/07/counterfeit‐medicine‐ 
afghanistan‐corruption‐border‐controls‐drugs‐poor). Harper & Stroute (2011, 29, 
available at http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s18434en/s18434en.pdf), 
noted that ‘The market presence of substandard and counterfeit medicines is likely to be 
significant and should be considered a public health menace requiring urgent attention’. 
This means that while the branded drugs cited may well be available, it will be difficult 
when filling a prescription to be sure that they are not counterfeit. Though that article is 
now 5 years old, I have witnessed the ongoing problems with medication. It is usual when 
visiting families who are less well educated for a large bag of medication to be produced 
so that I can check the expiry dates, explain the dosage and say whether or not I think the 
drugs are fake from Pakistan. A further problem is with prescribing itself. When drugs are 
prescribed, patients frequently fail to understand how they are supposed to take them or 
what precisely they are for. I am not a doctor, but on about 1 out of every 3 occasions, 
the medication is clearly not indicated for the symptons (vitamins for arthritis pain, pain 
killers for infections etc). The medical system in Afghanistan is in crisis (though of course 
there are also a number of dedicated and committed medical personnel, they are 
operating in extremely challenging conditions) and anyone who can afford to do so goes 
abroad: the middle and upper classes to India, and the poorer classes to Pakistan. Those 
who cannot fly travel many hours in taxis or buses, enduring extreme conditions because 
there is no faith in the Afghan health system. 
 
 
48. Re (iv) As mentioned above interactions between strangers meeting for the first time 
inevitably begin with establishing identity and trying to find common acquaintances or 
family members. Trust in Afghanistan has been severely tested through more than three 
decades of war, and until or unless someone’s identity has been established, they will be 
unable to find somewhere to stay, or someone to give them employment or support. 
Unless someone has access to support networks, he will find it difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to find livelihood opportunities. Professor Maley draws attention to a study 
by Kantor and Pain that emphasises the centrality of relationships to livelihoods in rural 
 
 
  
Afghanistan, and the points they make apply equally to urban areas (Paula Kantor and 
 
Adam Pain, Securing Life and Livelihoods in Afghanistan: The Role of Social 
 
Relationships,Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, December 2010). Even in 
Kabul University, people were usually employed on personal recommendations. In the 
absence of a functioning social security system, where there is a death among the 
workforce, even government posts, it is common for someone from the deceased’s 
family to be offered the vacant position and I have seen posts given to a niece and a 
brother. This leads to enormous frustration especially among the growing number of first 
generation graduates who do not have contacts in white collar jobs to give them the 
necessary recommendation, and who see unqualified and unsuitable individuals receive 
sinecures. 
 
49. Re (iv) Employment for everyone is scarce even in Kabul (conservative estimates put 
it at 48%), and when people do find work it is very poorly paid. Qualified teachers, 
engineers and other professionals are often unemployed, and where they do have work, 
they frequently subsidise their incomes by working as unlicensed taxi drivers to make 
ends meet. While those who have spent time in Europe may have gained valuable skills, 
it is unfortunately the case that jobs are mostly given to members of a social network 
rather than the most qualified person. Without a network it is not possible to find work. 
 
50. Re. (v)The 2016 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines offered the following comments on 
relocation to urban areas: 
 
Where the proposed area of relocation is an urban area where the applicant has no access 
to pre‐ identified accommodation and livelihood options, and where he or she cannot 
reasonably be expected to be able to fall back on meaningful support networks, the 
applicant would likely find him‐ or herself in a situation comparable to that of other urban 
IDPs. To assess the reasonableness of such an outcome, adjudicators need to take into 
account the scale of internal displacement in the area of prospective relocation, and the 
living conditions of IDPs in that location. Relevant considerations in this regard include the 
fact that IDPs are considered to be among the most vulnerable groups in 
 
Afghanistan, many of whom are beyond the reach of humanitarian organizations; as well 
as available information to the effect that urban IDPs are more vulnerable than the non‐ 
displaced urban poor, as they are particularly affected by unemployment; limited access to 
adequate housing; limited access to water and sanitation; and food insecurity 
 
51. The level of poverty in Kabul should not be underestimated. Most streets around 
Kabul are dotted with women in burkhas, some with children, or the elderly or disabled, 
who sit or stand in the potholes, hoping drivers will throw money at them. These are 
mostly IDPs who have come to Kabul from other provinces and have no support in Kabul. 
A person alone who would end up destitute or worse. 
 
 
 
 
 
CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION IN KABUL 
51. In terms of security, the situation in Afghanistan is extremely volatile and should be 
judged on the basis of the many current and up‐to‐date assessments easily accessible. 
 
52. According to a UN Security Council report to the General Assembly (1 September 
2015): 
 
Anti‐Government elements also continued to undertake high‐profile attacks in the 
country’s capital and in provincial capitals. Although they ostensibly targeted the 
Government and international forces, the brunt of the attacks continued to be borne by 
civilians. Significant attacks in the first part of the reporting period included one on the 
National Assembly on 22 June and attacks on international military convoys in Kabul on 
30 June, 7 July and 22 August, as well as suicide attacks on Afghan military and 
Government targets in the provincial capitals of Kandahar (25 May), Jalalabad (31 
May), Lashkar Gah (30 June) and Khost (12 July). Following the announcement of the 
death of Mullah Omar, the city of Kabul experienced a string of attacks between 7 and 
10 August, including suicide attacks in the vicinity of an Afghan National Army base, 
the police academy, an international military base and Kabul International Airport, 
which resulted in over 55 individuals killed and over 330 injured. 
 
53. The 2015 Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, prepared in 
coordination with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 
notes that: ‘Anti‐Government Elements focused on population centres (cities, towns, and 
large villages) – simultaneously challenging Government control of such centres while 
carrying out regular, deadly suicide attacks in major cities, particularly Kabul’ (February 
2016:6)… ‘In the central region, notably in Kabul city, complex and suicide attacks caused 
an 18 per cent increase in civilian casualties. For example, two suicide attacks in Kabul 
city on 7 August [2015] caused 355 civilian casualties (43 deaths and 312 injured) ‐ the 
highest number of civilians killed and injured in one day since UNAMA began 
systematically recording civilian casualties in 2009’ (February 2016: 9) [the fatalities were 
exceeded by almost 50% in April 2016, see §17 below, and almost 100% in July 2016]. 
 
54. In February / March 2015 the insurgents began their spring offensive and have 
continued to stage fatal attacks throughout the intervening months. Some of the most 
shocking include the Kabul attack on Parliament in June 2015, which although it did not 
generate many casualties, offered clear proof that the Taliban could enter the most 
secure environments. 
 
55. In August 2015, Brigadier General Shoffner (Resolute Support Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Communications) articulated a widespread feeling in Afghanistan that, in particular in 
Kabul, security had certainly worsened in the last year: "Kabul has strategic significance 
for the insurgency and there are really two main reasons for this. The first is that it is the 
visible symbol of the government's authority. It's the capital city. The second is that the 
attacks receive wide media coverage and it's what the insurgents want." He noted that 
 
insurgent attacks have increased in Kabul compared to the past year, and that militants 
want to show that the Afghan government is not able to ensure people's safety. Hours 
after Shoffner’s statement a suicide car bombing rocked the capital, killing at least 12 
people and injuring over 60 – including women and children 
(http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/21041‐attacks‐ 
 
56. The past 12 months have seen regular fatal attacks in Kabul: 
 
07/08/2015 Three suicide attacks kill 50, injure hundreds – 
(http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/20812‐kabul‐residents‐hold‐candlelight‐vigil‐ 
for‐blast‐victims) 
 
10/08/2015 Suicide attack kills 5, injures 16 – airport road, Kabul 
 
15/10/2015 Attack on vehicle in Kote Sangi area – three civilians injured, at least one 
child killed 
 
11/10/2015 Pule Arter explosion – attack on military convoy (close to Ansari high school 
for girls) injures three including child 
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/13/afghan‐forces‐repel‐taliban‐attack‐ 
on‐ghazni‐as‐offensive‐spreads) 
 
08/10/2015 restaurant attacked in Deh Bori, three injured, two guards killed 
 
05‐06/10/2015 Two suicide blasts near Russian embassy in Darulaman, battle goes on 
through the night – suicide bombers target Kabul home of former Governor of Helmand, 
seven police and one guard injured, families evacuated, power cut, 15 casualties, no 
fatalities (http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/10/kabul‐hit‐by‐twin‐suicide‐blasts 
http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/21739‐security‐forces‐kill‐3‐suicide‐bombers‐ 
after‐all‐night‐clash‐in‐kabul /) 
 
11/11/2015 Protest following beheading of seven Hazara, including child, ends with 
police firing on crowd attempting to storm the Palace – 10 protestors injured 
(http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/22292‐10‐protestors‐injured‐after‐security‐ 
forces‐opened‐fire; http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly‐forecast/2015‐ 
12/afghanistan_15.php?print=true) 
 
11/11/2015 Seven civilians, including a child and woman, were injured in a suicide car 
bombing that targeted British troop carriers in Kabul. 
 
http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/21824‐seven‐injured‐in‐kabul‐suicide‐  
bombing‐on‐foreign‐troops 
 
24/11/2015 Seven children killed by mine found on building site in Kabul 
(http://edition.cnn.com/2015/11/24/asia/afghanistan‐violence/index.html) 
 
28/11/2015 Attack on ANA vehicle carrying IEC personnel in Kabul, driver killed, guard 
injured (http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/22556‐kabul‐blast‐leaves‐one‐dead) 
 
As noted by the UN Security Council ‘The security situation in Afghanistan remains dire, 
with the Taliban carrying out a spate of attacks in Kabul and other parts of the country in 
early 2016, causing high levels of casualties to civilians and security forces’ 
(http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly‐forecast/2016‐03/afghanistan_16.php). 
 
 
 
 Unusually winter 2015/6 did not see the usual lull in attacks, but Nowroz (March 2016) 
saw an uptick in attacks across the country (see excellent report by Felbab‐Brown, 2016), 
attacks that have since continued including in Kabul, which witnessed the following large 
scale attacks (and many other smaller attacks) this year. 
 
 
1/1/2016:  the Taliban exploded a bomb and engaged in a firefight at a restaurant in Kabul, 
leading to the death of a child and wounding 15 others.  
4/1/2016:  a bomb-filled truck exploded at a facility for workers in Kabul, killing one civilian 
and injuring another 22 civilians.  
20/1/2016:  a Taliban suicide bomber attacked a bus carrying media personnel in Kabul on 20 
January, killing seven people and wounding more than 20; 
(http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2016-03/afghanistan16.php) 
1/2/2016:  A police facility in Kabul was struck by a suicide bomber on, resulting in the 
deaths of more than 20 police officers (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35459074),  
27/2/2016:  15 people killed (http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/02/suicide-bomber-
kills-11-eastern-afghanistan-160227062901757.html) 
15/4/2016:  multiple coordinated attacks across Kabul, including Presidential Palace 
(http://www.ndtv.com/photos/news/multiple-attacks-across-kabul-12795#photo-166872) 
19/4/2016:  64 killed in attack at Pul-e-Mahmud, Kabul (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-36091046) 
25/5/2016: 11 killed during morning rush hour 
(http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/taliban-suicide-bomber-kills-eleven-
commuters-in-kabul-during-morning-rush-hour-a7048211.html) 
20/6/2016:  14 people killed in central Kabul http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-
36573343 
30/6/2016:  27 police cadets killed, more than 40 wounded 
(http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-blast-idUSKCN0ZG0UY). 
23/7/2016:  80+ killed and at least 230 injured during peaceful demonstration by Hazaras 
protesting discrimination (http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36877928).  
24/8/2016:  16 killed, 50+ wounded in attack on American University campus, Darulaman, 
Kabul http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/26939-devastated-family-buries-their-
hardworking-son  
6/9/2016:  41 killed inttack on charity Care Hospital and Ministry of Defense, many more 
injured https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/kabul-shaken-by-attacks-on-international-
charity-and-defense-ministry/2016/09/06/6e9f34ea-7403-11e6-be4f-
3f42f2e5a49e_story.html?utm_term=.410d1ea46011  
*11/10/2016:  14 people killed and wounded dozens more at a shrine in Kabul 
(http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37621502)  
*21/11/2016: 30 worshippers killed, 80 injured at Shiite Shrine 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-blast-idUSKBN13G0OS27 
27/11/2016:  5 Afghans, one Briton killed in attack on British diplomats 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/27/kabul-suicide-attack-uk-embassy-six-dead  
21/12/2016:  8  killed and 6 others were wounded when 3 Taliban gunmen attacked the 
Dashti Barchi home of the MP for Helmand Province, Mir Wali, in Kabul. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-attack-idUSKBN14A1W1  
10/1/2017:  30 killed in 2 explosions near the Parliament in Darulaman, dozens injured 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-38567241  
7/2/2017:  21 killed in attack on Supreme Court, dozens injured 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/07/world/asia/afghanistan-suicide-bombing-supreme-
court.html?_r=0; http://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/un-condemns-kabul-supreme-court-
bombing 
1/3/2017:  22 killed, 100 injured in attack on Police Academy 
http://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/blast-reported-kabul 
7/3/2017:  50 killed, 91 injured in attack on hospital 
http://www.tolonews.com/afghanistan/did-someone-let-attackers-kabul-hospital 
13/3/2017:  1 killed, 20 injured in attack on minibus 
http://www.euronews.com/2017/03/13/afghanistan-blast-one-dead-and-nearly-20-injured-in-
deadly-minibus-explosion  
 
 
57. I was in Kabul for a number of these attacks, and hearing rumours that casualties 
were much higher than reported, I raised the issue with a senior contact in the Justice 
Department and an experienced journalist (who has worked for the New York Times). 
Both said yes, the casualties were significantly higher, but government sources were 
already concerned about the demoralizing effect of these attacks. With reference to 
UNAMA figures, it was noted that UNAMA requires three verifiable sources, and these 
are not always available. When I asked why journalists were not following up on this, it 
was explained that, unlike in Europe, for example, the dead are often not taken to 
hospital or a morgue. In many cases, they are immediately taken home to be washed and 
will be buried the following morning. Eventually, the figure will be corrected, but it will 
take months. 
 
58. Such attacks: 
 
can properly be regarded as indiscriminate in the sense that, albeit they may have 
specific or general targets, they inevitably expose the ordinary civilian who 
happens to be at the scene to what has been described in argument as collateral 
damage. The means adopted may be bombs, which can affect others besides the 
target, or shootings, which produce a lesser but nonetheless real risk of collateral 
damage’ (Kelly, April 2015 (1.3.2) accessed at 
https://www.ein.org.uk/blog/judicial‐analysis‐article‐15‐c‐qualification‐directive‐ 
and‐international‐protection‐issues#ref9). 
 
The impact of these attacks on the morale of the city is considerable, and although 
‘normal’ life and everyday activities continue, women with whom I have spoken have 
regularly referred to the constant, nagging fear that their husbands and children will not 
return when they leave the house. 
 
59. The attack by Daesh in July is particularly worrying. The Institute for the Study of War 
in a backgrounder by Harleen Gambhir from 3 December 2015 states: 
 
‘The Islamic State of Iraq and Al‐Sham (ISIS)’s affiliate in the Afghanistan‐Pakistan 
region is effective, operational and positioned to expand… These violent conditions 
will likely facilitate Wilayat Khorasan’s recruitment, attacks, and territorial 
expansion. Afghanistan’s precarious unity government has not maintained effective 
security as international forces have drawn down. Wilayat Khorasan’s growth gives 
ISIS additional strategic resiliency outside of Iraq and Syria and will intensify the 
global competition between ISIS and al‐Qaeda (AQ), which is also present in the 
area’(http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%20in%20Afghanis 
t an_2.pdf. 
 
 
 According to AFP reports, the UN announced that ISIS have a presence in 25 of 
Afghanistan’s 34 provinces (http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/south‐asia/isis‐gaining‐ 
ground‐in‐afghanistan‐un‐report ), though it remains difficult to ascertain how much of 
this presence is due to disgruntled sections of the Taliban simply re‐branding themselves 
– in particular in order to gain access to resources. The attack in Kabul in July 2016 is 
unusual but is certainly evidence of their capacity to strike with dramatic and fatal 
consequences. 
 
60. As well as casualties, the increasing violence has led to a sharp and significant 
increase in internally displaced people: in the first six months of 2016, the conflict 
displaced 157,987 Afghans from their place of origin, a 10 per cent increase compared to 
the same period in 2015 and resulting in an estimated 1.2 million conflict‐induced 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan (UNAMA 2016a). The UNHCR 
guidelines (2016) recommend that levels of displacement are an important indicator of 
levels of generalized violence. 
 
61. In line with the increasing violence and casualties, fear and anxiety about the future 
has risen amongst the population. As noted by The Asian Foundation (TAF)’s most recent 
‘Survey of the People, published on 19 November 2015 “optimism about the country’s 
overall direction has dropped: 57.5% of Afghans now say that things are moving in the 
wrong direction, up from 40.5% in last year’s survey, and the highest percentage to say 
so since the study began”, unsurprising perhaps given that “[t]he survey was conducted 
in the midst of the country’s deadliest fighting season since the Intervention in 2001, 
which saw heavy loss of life for both the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces 
(ANDSF) and civilians.” (http://acsor‐surveys.com/research/the‐asia‐foundation‐releases‐ 
2015‐survey‐of‐the‐afghan‐people/). The decline in confidence in the government, its 
capacity to provide security, and the conditions for economic stability if not growth, and 
the growth of fear for the future is widespread and visible in particular during the 
demonstrations seen in Kabul in the last 12 months. 
 
62. Currently, the Taliban/insurgents are active in 32 out of 34 provinces (see Annex 1 & 
2) and the security forces are have to battle for control of many districts. Almost all 
provinces have seen a sharp decline in security and an increase in attacks and casualties 
(see UNAMA 2016). 
 
63. For all these reasons: the growing confidence of the Taliban, the arrival of ISIS/Daesh, 
the weakness of the National Unity Government, and a growing sense of despair 
following the euphoria of the first round of the Presidential elections in April 2014 – 
Afghanistan is in an extremely fragile and volatile situation. Fear and pessimism are 
widespread, and there is little evidence of hope that the situation will improve. This 
pessimism is shared by the U.N. According to Nicholas Haysom (UN special envoy to 
Afghanistan) if Afghanistan merely survives 2016, the United Nations mission in the 
country will consider it a success (Eltaf Najafizada, 
 
 
 
 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016‐03‐16/afghanistan‐s‐goal‐for‐this‐year
‐ is‐just‐to‐survive‐un‐says). 
 
 
 
 
SUFFICIENCY OF PROTECTION 
 
64. It is true that currently there exists a national police force and national security 
structure, and that the security forces (Afghan National Police [ANP], Afghan National 
Security Forces [ANSF], Afghan National Army [ANA] and Afghan Local Police [ALP]) have 
increased in numbers in recent years, and increasingly taken responsibility for security. In 
2014 in particular, the population’s confidence in these forces increased considerably, 
especially given their success around the elections – although there were significant 
numbers of attacks, they were not as ferocious as feared. However, 2015 & 2016 have 
seen confidence in embattled security forces decline, especially following the fall of 
Kunduz in September 2015, and news in the past couple of months of more districts in 
the South and North falling to the Taliban. Giustozzi & Ali’s (2016) analysis of the state of 
the ANA following the ISAF withdrawal argues that corruption, incompetence and 
nepotism were key factors in Kunduz. They are also the reasons for the public’s lack of 
trust in the security forces. 
 
65. The priority for the security forces is the general security of the country and the 
cities, rather than individuals. The Afghan police and Special Forces do manage to foil 
many attacks but the Taliban are still capable of conducting operations in the capital, 
including on 25 March 2015, when a Vehicle Born IED (VBIED) was detonated in Police 
District 2 near the Ministry of Finance and the Presidential Palace, killing 6 and injuring 
31 civilians. In July 2016, the government tried to ban the TUTAP demonstration by the 
Enlightenment Movement that was attacked because it could not guarantee security. The 
measures they put in place (blocking streets with containers) made quick access for the 
emergency services very difficult and contributed to the high number of fatalities (80) 
and further undermined the government’s legitimacy. 
 
66. The ANSF are suffering themselves and their casualties have increased sharply as they 
have taken over sole responsibility for security (UNHCR 2016: 11). Felbab‐Brown of the 
Brooking Institute (2016: 9) suggests that: 
 
the casualty rate might have been 28 percent higher in 2015 than in 2014, a year when 
at least some top-level U.S. military officers considered the ANSF casualty rate 
unsustainable. In 2014, more than 20,000 soldiers and support personnel were lost due 
to deaths and injuries as a result of combat, desertions, and discharges. Long facing 
even more pressure from the Taliban than has the Afghan military, the police lost 
almost a quarter of its members in 2015, some 36,000, many through desertions’. 
 
Giustozzi and Ali (2016) are sure that ANA casualties for 2015 are increasing in line with 
casualties in the previous years: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
cited in Giustozzi, A & Ali, M. A., 2016: 4 
 
For fear of the demoralising effect of such high figures, General Azimi, the Ministry of 
Defence spokesman announced that they would not publish the number of ANSF deaths 
in future in order to safeguard morale (though from my experience talking to members 
of the public, this strategy is counter‐productive: people do not trust any of the figures in 
the media) 
(http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324665604579081193199072318). 
 
67. According to a remarkably accurate forecast by the Center for Strategic Studies 
 
Independent Assessment of the Afghan National security Forces (2014): 
 
the security environment in Afghanistan will become more challenging after the 
drawdown of most international forces in 2014, and […] the Taliban insurgency will 
become a greater threat to Afghanistan’s stability in the 2015–2018 timeframe than it 
is now… In the 2015–2016 timeframe, we assess that the Taliban are likely to try to 
keep military pressure on the ANSF in rural areas, expand their control and influence in 
areas vacated by coalition forces, encircle key cities, conduct high‐profile attacks in 
Kabul and other urban areas, and gain leverage for reconciliation negotiations. In 2016–
2018, once the insurgency has had time to recover from the last several years of U.S. 
and NATO operations, a larger and more intense military effort will become increasingly 
likely. We conclude that the ANSF will continue to have significant gaps in 
capability that will limit their effectiveness after 2014. 
 
(http://www.cna.org/sites/default/files/research/CNA%20Independent%20Assessment 
%20of%20the%20ANSF.pdf) 
 
68. This assessment included ‘the pillars of the Afghan National Police (ANP), which are 
the Afghan Border Police (ABP), Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), Afghan 
Uniform Police (AUP), and Afghan Anti‐Crime Police (AACP); the Afghan Local Police 
(ALP);’. Against this background, it is unreasonable to expect the security forces to be 
able to offer individual protection to the majority of Afghan citizens. 
 
69. However, it is not only the ability, but also the willingness of the security forces that 
have been called into question. As noted above, the ANSF have improved in recent years, 
but continue to be plagued by accusations of corruption. In their careful, but devastating 
critique of the ANA, Giustozzi & Ali (2016: 5) cite an ANA Commander in Balkh: 
 
Since these foreign advisers left the battalions, there are no schedules, and the 
commanders are not behaving well with their soldiers. When the foreign advisers 
were there, there was no corruption, but now there is a lot of corruption in these 
battalions. 
 
Closely related to corruption, is the problem of nepotism, where competence matters 
significantly less than contacts (2016:11). Giustozzi & Ali point to a further problem, citing 
an MoD general, a lack of coordination between the Army and the Police: 
 
There is no coordination between the Afghan army and Afghan police at all. One of 
the reasons why the Taliban are becoming powerful against Afghan forces is the 
lack of coordination between the Afghan army and police. I have information that 
when the Taliban attack a police post near an Afghan army post, the Afghan army 
will not support the police. The same is true when the Taliban attack an Afghan 
army post—the police will not support the ANA (2016: 13). 
 
70. The Afghan Local Police [ALP] was established in 2010 at the behest of the US 
government (who funds it) as an armed defence force at village‐level without police 
powers to “secure local communities and prevent rural areas from infiltration of 
insurgent groups”. It was an attempt to bring the different militias maintained by 
warlords across the country under the control of the government. However, 5 years later, 
the review of the ALP programme ordered by President Ghani reportedly resulted in the 
identification of 2,200 ALP under the control of local powerbrokers (UNAMA 2016: 68). 
Since their creation, they have suffered a disproportionately higher level of casualties 
than their army counterparts mainly because of poor equipment, training and planning, 
but in the second quarter of 2016, casualties dropped to the still significant 295 from 403 
during the same quarter last year (http://www.reuters.com/article/us‐ 
 
afghanistan‐police‐idUSKCN0ZP0EK). 
 
71. However, as documented by Human Rights Watch and UNAMA, the ALP are 
committing significant human rights abuses across the country, including intimidation, 
beating, illegal detentions and child rape (http://www.reuters.com/article/us‐ 
afghanistan‐police‐idUSKCN0ZP0EK). In March 2015, Human Rights Watch have 
published a 106 page report into the culture of impunity1 that leaves Afghans without 
 
1The report focused on eight of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces (Balkh, Ghazni, Kandahar, 
Kunduz, Paktiya, Paktika, Takhar and Uruzgan). Similar abuses occur right across the 
country and describes in detail the torture, arbitrary detention, sexual abuse and 
extrajudicial killings conducted by senior figures and their men from different ethnic 
groups. The report relies on 125 interviews and corroboration from Afghan and foreign 
 
 
 
protection (Human Rights Watch, "Today We Shall All Die": Afghanistan's Strongmen 
and the Legacy of Impunity, available at: 
 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/54f6c1e44.html [accessed 6 March 2015]. The report 
includes accounts of ALP abuses, such as the one cited at para.11 above, or the following: 
 
It is hard to say who the local people fear more, though: their ‘defenders’ — ALP 
and other militias— or the Taliban themselves. According to a resident, shortly 
before the elections, many houses in the area were looted by Mir Alam’s 
commanders, including Commander Qadirak. As residents had feared what the 
Taleban might do to them on Election Day, they fled the area, only to return and 
find their houses ransacked by Mir Alam’s militias. (p.58) 
 
72. As the report continued: 
 
More than 13 years after the overthrow of the Taliban government, Afghans 
continue to suffer serious human rights abuses by government and military 
officials and their agents. Perpetrators are rarely held to account and the victims 
are rarely able to gain legal redress. This impunity hinges on the inability or 
unwillingness of the Afghan government and its institutions, including the 
military, police, and courts, to challenge the strongmen and militias who operate 
throughout much of the country. The administration of former President Hamid 
Karzai installed many powerful warlords and failed to confront others, while 
many others have been funded by and worked alongside international forces, 
further entrenching them politically into the fabric of Afghan society. (p.1) 
 
73. Abuses were also described in the most recent UNAMA report though in less detail 
(2016, p.67‐9). These include extrajudicial killings, severe beatings, theft and harassment 
perpetrated by members of the ALP on civilians, and the rape of women, girls and 
teenage boys (see, among others, US State Department report 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186669.pdf ). Understandably, it is rare 
for Afghan citizens to report crimes to or seek protection from the security forces. This 
attitude softened after the first round of elections in April 2014, where there was an 
outpouring of gratitude to the security forces who were widely seen to have prevented 
large scale attacks in the two weeks up to and including election day (April 5), but since 
then this has abated. 
 
74. During the preparation of a previous report, I took advantage of a meeting with a 
senior commander of one of the Special Forces Units (4.30pm 13/11/2014) to confirm 
the reluctance of people to go to the police. As a serving officer, the commander insisted 
that, if cited, he remain anonymous. For that reason, I have not given background detail 
 
officials, who have submitted evidence, including to the Afghanistan Independent Homan 
Rights Commission. The latter compiled a comprehensive report which President Karzai 
blocked. 
  
that might identify him. I attest to the accuracy of the following account, though it was 
not recorded. I have since heard the same views expressed by other contacts working in 
different government departments and members of the general public. I wrote up the 
notes within hours of the conversation. Because the commander had in the past 
expressed frustration at the release of people he and his men had arrested following the 
payment of bribes, I felt able to ask him to comment on the view that the Afghan police 
forces were largely concerned with overall security and rarely had the time, resources, 
training or inclination to investigate crime. 
 
LS: Would it be unfair to say the police [ALP] can’t really deal with crime, that 
they are more focused on security – on the threat from the Taliban, insurgents etc.? 
 
PC: (Reluctantly) well…yes. They are trying to secure the village or town itself, so 
they are not so concerned with what what’s happening inside the village between the 
villagers. And you have to understand – it is only recently that Afghanistan has had a 
police force. People still haven’t got used to the idea of going to the police – they will 
go to village elders. They still do what they have traditionally done. (The commander 
went on to describe an incident in his own family where a dispute over the recent 
elections escalated and a young man was shot. Eight months later [at the time of the 
interview], the dispute continues but the police have not been involved). 
 
LS: What do you think of reports that the police, especially the ALP [Afghan Local 
Police] are just a private militia for powerful figures around the country? 
 
PC: Yeah, well, I guess that’s true in lots of places. But the ALP are brand new and 
not educated. Even my guys aren’t literate. They [the ALP] were an idea of General 
 
McCrystal’s – I remember the conversations in 2010, and they have really only been 
functioning since 2011‐12. 
 
LS: I have read that 90% of people would not go to the police. 
 
PC: Most people don’t have police they can go to! Even in the most modern 
 
Afghan towns, most people won’t go to the police about crimes – they will try to solve 
things their own way or the traditional way. 
 
LS: Is it true that people don’t really trust the state or the police. 
 
PC: ‘The state’ and ‘the police’ are pretty far from most people’s experience in 
 
Afghanistan – it’s not like Britain or the US! 
 
75. During a subsequent meeting (30 November 2014), discussing a wave of recent 
attacks in Kabul (10‐30 November 2014), the commander was even more scathing, 
angrily describing the behavior of local police, citing examples of the police selling cars 
used in suicide attacks for scrap and stealing personal effects from some of the homes 
bombed in the attacks (he claimed to have found local police leaving the site of one 
attack with mobile phones and a laptop). 
 
76. I witnessed an example of dealings with the police, as a colleague attempted to free 
 
 
his father‐in‐law who was kidnapped in 2015. A ransom was paid to the kidnappers who 
then ‘sold’ him to the Taliban, who forced him to sign an agreement to pay 10% of the 
profits to them every month. Incredulous, I asked why he didn’t go to the police. My 
colleague had been to the police who explained they did not have the resources to 
investigate, and he would have to pay them to try and release his father‐in‐law. The 
original kidnapper has a brother in Parliament so would in any case be immune to arrest 
and prosecution. 
 
77. In a recent conversation (20 December 2015) with a senior Afghan advisor in the 
Justice Sector Support Programme (this is a USAID funded programme that advises and 
supports Afghanistan’s Mininstry of Justice) in his home in one of Kabul’s secure, gated 
communities, he indicated that there was absolutely no guarantee that perpetrators 
would be brought to justice or the remaining family members of victims protected. He 
said that in spite of considerable effort and investment, the Justice system was simply 
not functioning. 
 
78. President Ghani, on 20 March 2015, in response to allegations that police stood by 
and did nothing to stop the killing of Farkhunda (the young woman beaten to death and 
burnt outside the Shah Do Shamshir Mosque in Kabul on 19 March 2015), said that the 
incident revealed "a fundamental issue" — that security forces are too focused on the 
fight against the Taliban insurgency to concentrate on community policing 
(http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/afghanistan‐buries‐woman‐beaten‐ 
death‐mob‐29818410.  
79. On World Refugee Day last year (20 June 2015), President Ghani made a speech 
about Afghan migrants around the world thanking those countries hosting them and then 
asked ‘My request to those countries is that due to the current unstable situation of 
Afghanistan, please stop the forced deportation of Afghans’ (video of the original speech 
available here:  
https://www.facebook.com/ashrafghani.af/videos/vb.34246523291/1015312772186829 
2/?type=2&theater). However, a politically weak President Ghani has since succumbed to 
significant political pressure from e.g. Prime Minister Cameron2 and from Chancellor 
Merkel (http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/afghanistan‐will‐abgeschobene‐fluechtlinge‐ 
wieder‐aufnehmen‐a‐1060647.html to accept forcible returns. On the objective measures 
detailed above and acknowledged by Afghan and International sources, there is 
insufficient protection for individuals or families facing security threats in Afghanistan – 
the security forces are too thinly stretched, and too weakened by corruption, 
incompetence and nepotism to be able to help. The Taliban surge in the past 12 months, 
and a series of successes across the country from Kunduz in the North to Helmand in the 
South and Jalalabad in the East have put enormous pressure on all the government’s 
forces ensuring that the police are simply unable to protect ordinary Afghan citizens, and 
 
 
2
 Interviews with civil servants from the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (July 2016, and 
sight of letter from Acting Ambassador Chatterton‐Dickson describing visits to Minister 
Rabbani, Minister Balkhi and a telephone call from David Cameron to Ashraf Ghani). 
 
 
 
while there are a number of brave and conscientious police officers, too many constitute 
a threat to ordinary citizens. 
 
 
80. On the basis of my conversation with Mr X, my reading of the documents in his case, 
my knowledge of Baghlan and Kabul, the information gathered for this report and the 
current security situation in Kabul, I would have extremely serious concerns for his life 
and safety if he were forcibly returned to Afghanistan. 
 
81. I confirm that insofar as the facts stated in my report are within my own knowledge I 
have made clear which they are and I believe them to be true, and that the opinions I 
have expressed represent my true and complete professional opinion. 
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Annex 1 
 
 
Afghan refugee minister: Afghans should be treated on par with Syrians 
 
Despite media reports claiming Germany wants more Afghan migrants to return to their 
homeland, Afghanistan's refugee minister tells DW why the EU country should accept 
more, instead of fewer, Afghan asylum seekers. 26/10/2015 
http://www.dw.com/en/afghan-refugee-minister-afghans-should-be-treated-on- 
par-with-syrians/a-18806357 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding several measures by European governments to curb the influx of 
refugees, hundreds of thousands of migrants continue to undertake perilous 
journeys to reach Germany and other EU nations. 
 
In order to deal with the rapidly growing refugee numbers, German media reports 
claim that Berlin wants fewer Afghans - who make up the second-largest group of 
people seeking asylum in Germany - to come to Europe and more of them to 
return to their home country. 
 
According to a report by German daily Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
(FAZ), the German government wants the European Commission to negotiate a 
readmission agreement with Afghanistan for migrants whose asylum applications 
have been rejected. 
 
The FAZ report added that Germany's Interior Ministry no longer views 
Afghanistan as being in the same situation as Syria, which is in the midst of a civil 
war. 
 
The paper says the ministry views the security situation in parts of Afghanistan - 
such as Kabul and certain tribal areas - as relatively stable, meaning people could 
be sent back to these zones. In order to curb the refugee influx, Berlin also plans to 
launch a campaign to deter would-be migrants from coming to Europe, the article 
added. 
 
 
 
However, in a DW interview, Afghan Minister of Refugees and Repatriations 
Sayed Hussian Alimi Balkhi says that Germany and other EU countries should 
avoid deporting Afghan asylum seekers. He stressed that security in the country 
has been deteriorating as terrorist groups such as the Taliban and "Islamic 
State" are gaining ground in Afghanistan and putting civilians at risk. 
 
DW: Is the Afghan government aware of the German government's alleged plans to 
deport Afghan refugees whose asylum applications have been rejected? 
 
Sayed Hussian Alimi Balkhi: We are not aware of such a decision. We have an 
agreement with the Germans on deportations, according to which they have to 
provide us a list of Afghan asylum seekers who they are planning to deport. We 
have not received such a list so far. 
 
I met with a German government delegation in Geneva recently. In the meeting I 
stressed that the security in Afghanistan was deteriorating. I asked them 
explicitly not to deport any Afghan asylum seekers as the situation in Afghanistan 
was still very fragile. At the same time, I urged the German authorities to accept 
more Afghan refugees. 
 
What challenges do Afghan asylum seekers face in Germany? 
 
Just last week, I invited the German ambassador to Afghanistan to my office and 
officially requested the German government to avoid deportation of Afghan 
asylum seekers. During the meeting, I stressed that Germany should approve 
more asylum requests from Afghans based on conditions on the ground. 
 
We all witnessed security incidents in Kunduz, Baghlan, Nangarhar, Sare Pul and 
Faryab provinces. Other Afghan provinces are also facing security challenges. 
 
If Germany starts deporting Afghans, how will the Afghan 
government react to the situation? 
 
We will act according to the agreement we have with the German government. 
According to the agreement, vulnerable Afghan asylum seekers, families that fall 
apart as a result of deportation, Afghans who come from unsafe areas, children 
and single mothers, cannot be deported from Germany. 
 
Asylum seekers who do not fall under one of these five categories can only be 
deported if the Germans provide us a list of their names in advance and after we 
reach an agreement on how to proceed. 
 
Deteriorating security is the main factor behind migration from Afghanistan. 
During my last meeting with EU officials, I highlighted the dangers that Afghans 
face in their country, calling on the EU states, including Germany, to approve 
more asylum requests from Afghans given the deteriorating security situation. 
 
The Afghan government hopes that EU countries will understand the situation on 
the ground and show their support for Afghan immigrants. 
 
Will the Afghan government officially receive any deportees from Germany? 
 
 
 
 
We will only look into cases of deportations if they are according to the agreement 
we have with Germany. If any Afghan is deported in violation of the agreement, 
we will strongly request Germany to comply with the agreement. 
 
Does the Afghan government have the resources to provide services 
to potential Afghan deportees? 
 
We do not have any resources to help any potential deportees from Germany 
or any other European country. 
 
The German government classifies refugees from Syria as those in need of a 
"high rate of protection." That means they are given priority as compared to 
Afghans who only enjoy a "medium rate of protection" in Germany. Given the 
worsening security situation, do you believe the German government should 
classify Afghans as people in need of a "high rate of protection?" 
 
The IS terrorist group has presence in eastern Afghanistan. The group carries out 
executions and target killings everyday. Afghanistan faces the same problems as 
Syria and in some cases the problems are even more critical compared to Syria. 
 
We have explained the security situation in Afghanistan to all EU countries and, 
therefore, ask them to process asylum requests from Afghans with the same 
priority level as any other conflict-ridden country, including Syria. 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex 2 Meeting with the Minister for Refugees and Repatriation 28 February 2015 
 
1. As a researcher studying forced removal to Afghanistan, and having met the previous 
Minister and his deputy, I was anxious to meet the new Minister and discuss his plans for 
the future, and in particular to clarify his position on returns as there were rumours 
circulating that he had announced a stop on all deportations. 
 
2. A young Anglo‐Afghan, working with Afghan asylum seekers in the UK who had 
returned to visit family in Kabul contacted me through a mutual acquaintance and met 
me to discuss his concerns for clients who were being returned. Some days later, he 
called me to say that he had a meeting with the Minister and would I like to accompany 
him. 
 
3. Before the meeting I received a message from Eva Joly, MEP and Chair of the LIBE 
committee on Migrants Rights, who works as part of the Independent Monitoring 
Evaluation Committee (MEC) that had investigated corruption at the Ministry and we 
agreed that she would accompany us (she had another meeting scheduled at the 
Ministry immediately after our meeting with the rest of the MEC). We were also joined 
by Abdul Ghafoor, who monitors returns for the UK NGO Refugee Support Network. 
 
4. At the Ministry, on Saturday 28 February, we met the Minister in his office with his 
interpreter and with some of the staff who had been in the Ministry under the previous 
 
  
Minster. The meeting lasted 30 minutes. I began by introducing the four of us and 
explained that we had heard conflicting reports about a change in policy. 
 
5. The Minister explained that he had sent a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be 
forwarded to those European countries with whom Afghanistan has MoUs governing the 
forced removal of Afghan citizens: he mentioned explicitly the UK, Norway, Denmark, 
Sweden and Australia. Minister Balkhi told us that the letter asked that those countries 
refrain from forcibly returning Afghan citizens because there has been a significant 
deterioration in security in the past few years since these MoUs were signed, 
commenting that currently 80% of the country is insecure and unsafe. 
 
6. The Minister made the point that since the foreign forces had handed over 
responsibility to the Afghan Security Forces, the security situation in Afghanistan had 
become unstable. He noted that the insurgents had rallied and were placing the security 
forces under enormous pressure in most Afghan provinces. He wants all removals 
suspended until the situation stabilizes. 
 
7. According to the Minister, he is unwilling to continue operating the current MoUs until 
new ones are negotiated because the removing countries are breaching conditions: 
women and children and people who are mentally and physically unwell are being 
removed, as well as those who cannot be returned to their provinces of origin. The 
minister argued that only those who could safely be returned to their provinces of origin 
should be removed. According to him, it was not reasonable to expect Kabul to be able to 
receive all those who are forcibly returned (especially when they are from other 
provinces, and or have been born outside Afghanistan). In the Minister’s view, only 
Bamiyan and Panjshir were safe3, but the roads to Bamiyan are not. 
 
8. The Minister told us that the letter had not yet been sent to the partner countries: the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was studying it and would discuss it with the Minister for 
Refugees and Repatriation before sending it to those countries. However, I have since 
heard that the Norwegian government has confirmed to the media that they have 
received this letter. 
 
9. The Minister also made reference to a second letter requesting the suspension of the 
removal of a family from Norway. 
 
10. Before leaving, Mr Balkhi asked the four people present to please use their contacts 
to pressurize the Norwegian government to stop a charter flight due on 15th March and 
another March flight from UK. He was particularly keen that Ms Joly take his message to 
 
 
3
 See annex 2 for extract from a Triple Canopy report which substantiates Minister Balkhi’s 
view. In the week covered by the report, there were security incidents in every province in 
Afghanistan except Bamiyan and Panjshir. Triple Canopy is a provider of mission support, 
security, training and advisory services to government agencies and multinational corporations 
in challenging locations. 
 
 
 the European Parliament. 
 
11. To be clear: the Minister is of the opinion that no further deportations should take 
place until the MoUs have been revised. In the meantime, he said that unaccompanied 
women and children, those with mental and physical problems, those who are 
particularly vulnerable and those who come from dangerous provinces outside of Kabul 
will definitely not be allowed to disembark at Kabul airport. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
